Journal of Strategic Security
Volume 7
Number 2 Volume 7, No. 2, Special Issue
Summer 2014: The Global SOF Network

Article 3

Global SOF and Interagency Collaboration
Christopher Lamb
Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, lambc@ndu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss

pp. 8-20
Recommended Citation

Lamb, Christopher. "Global SOF and Interagency Collaboration." Journal of
Strategic Security 7, no. 2 (2014) : 8-20.
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.7.2.2
Available at: https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol7/iss2/3
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Open Access Journals at Digital
Commons @ University of South Florida. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Strategic
Security by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ University of South Florida. For more
information, please contact scholarcommons@usf.edu.

Global SOF and Interagency Collaboration
Abstract
The United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) has emphasized the
importance of international SOF collaboration, or what USSOCOM refers to as a “global
SOF network.” It is difficult to achieve requisite levels of collaboration even among
departments and agencies within a single country, much less on an international basis. Yet
USSOCOM has been rightly praised for its trailblazing collaboration efforts in
counterterrorism operations, so perhaps it can extend successful collaboration to its
“global SOF network.” This article argues collaboration lessons from the past decade of
counterterrorism operations can be used to facilitate better international SOF
collaboration. Even if the lessons are well recognized they will be hard to act upon,
especially when USSOCOM is using its indirect approach to SOF missions managed out of
U.S. embassies overseas. But the first step in solving any problem is recognizing the nature
of the problem and what is required to solve it. The rest is all disciplined, aggressive and
intelligent implementation, which Special Operations Forces do well.

Erratum
P. 10: Figure 1 in the published version shows an adapted diagram from the US Army Field
Manual (3-60) with notations inserted in red to reflect the notations made on a hand drawn
diagram that appeared on p. 153 of Stanley A. McChrystal's book, My Share of the Task: A
Memoir (Portfolio/Penguin, 2013). The author originally inserted in the manuscript a
captured image of the diagram that appeared on p. 153 of Gen. McChrystal's book. The
notations were McChrystal's, not those of author (Christopher Lamb), and their
representation in the published diagram was not intended to suggest otherwise.
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Introduction
Historically, special operations forces (SOF) have been the preferred military
units for irregular threats like terrorism and insurgency. Such threats are
increasingly transnational, threatening the welfare of multiple countries if not the
international community as a whole. Accordingly, over the past few years the
United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) has emphasized the
importance of international SOF collaboration, or what USSOCOM refers to as a
“global SOF network,” particularly for counterterrorism but other irregular
threats as well.1
The value of counterterrorism collaboration across national boundaries is well
recognized, as is the difficulty of international cooperation in areas as sensitive as
special operations. While nations share a common goal in combating terrorism,
their agendas frequently diverge and reconciling those competing objectives is
challenging. Indeed, it is difficult to achieve the high levels of collaboration
among national security organizations required for effective counterterrorism
operations within a single country. Extending the level of required collaboration
to multiple national SOF forces is even more difficult. USSOCOM has been
praised for its trailblazing efforts in interagency collaboration in
counterterrorism operations, and now it is equally determined to extend and
strengthen its “global SOF network.” The argument made in this article is that
lessons about collaborating across organizational boundaries from the past
decade of counterterrorism operations can be used to facilitate better
international SOF collaboration through USSOCOM’s global SOF network.

Interagency Collaboration in SOF Counterterrorism Operations
USSOCOM is now widely recognized for achieving unprecedented levels of
interagency collaboration in support of its counterterrorism efforts since
September 11, 2001.2 Prior to 2001, SOF counterterrorism operations often were
hobbled by lack of “actionable” intelligence; i.e., intelligence considered reliable,
comprehensive, detailed, and timely enough to justify the risks associated with
launching SOF to attack terrorists. Following the September 11, 2001 terror
attacks, the tolerance for risk skyrocketed, but SOF also had to solve the
actionable intelligence problem. The SOF units with lead counterterrorism
responsibilities, often referred to as special mission units by USSOCOM leaders,
reasoned they had to build interagency teams in Washington, D.C. and in the
field to tap, analyze, and exploit all the U.S. intelligence sources available for
immediate support of SOF counterterrorism operations. They succeeded and in
the process took counterterrorism operations to an unprecedented level of
efficacy.
These combined teams of interagency analysts and SOF operators conducted
network-based targeting. They used all-source intelligence, including intelligence
McRaven, William H. Admiral, "Panel Discussion," National Defense Industrial Association
(NDIA) Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC) Symposium, Washington, D.C.,
February 10-12, 2014.
2 Unless otherwise noted, the following discussion draws upon Christopher Lamb and Evan
Munsing, “Secret Weapon: High-value Target Teams as an Organizational Innovation,” Strategic
Perspectives, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, March 2011.
1
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gathered during their own operations, to chart terrorist organizations and build
target portfolios on key terrorists that the SOF teams could act upon
immediately. They had to balance the risk of revealing information sources with
the need to move quickly before their targets or their associates could be warned,
which was difficult. However, co-locating representatives from all the U.S.
intelligence agencies with SOF operators on a sustained basis greatly improved
information sharing and thus enabled persistent surveillance of adversaries. The
interagency teams eliminated the organizational seams that can delay intelligence
sharing and inhibit momentum.
Too often counterterrorism operations operated on the basis of stale intelligence
and slow approval processes. Before SOF could launch an attack, the target had
moved on and escaped. Interagency field teams with good connectivity to parent
organizations and their unique sources of information provided an “unblinking
eye” for persistent tracking of high-value targets. They also allowed U.S. forces to
make better decisions about what targets to take down and when. Over time, the
special mission units’ counterterrorist operations were better coordinated with
other U.S. forces conducting counterinsurgency operations, although tensions
between the two types of forces and missions remained a problem.
As SOF gained an understanding of the requirements for successful interagency
operations, it expanded the use of interagency teams in Iraq, Afghanistan, and
elsewhere. SOF leaders also built interagency teams at higher levels of the
national security system to support interagency coordination and
counterterrorist campaign planning. Most of these organizational constructs are
referred to as Joint Interagency Task Forces (JIATF). USSOCOM has become a
major proponent and user of JIATFs, interagency education, and best practices.
Among the many lessons from USSOCOM-sponsored interagency operations four
are especially noteworthy.

Lessons from Joint Interagency Task Forces
A few years ago little was known about SOF interagency teams, but there is an
increasing body of literature now devoted to the topic, including General Stanley
McChrystal’s memoirs. Excerpts from McChrystal’s memoirs demonstrate four
key requirements for successful interagency organizations. The prerequisites for
success can also be illustrated with examples from JIATF South, the highly
successful U.S. counternarcotics organization that pioneered effective joint
interagency operations.3 It is easier to illustrate principles for effective
interagency operations using examples from JIATF South because
counternarcotics operations are not as highly classified as special operations.4
SOF-managed JIATFs and JIATF South share many common elements, and not
entirely coincidentally. USSOCOM was one of many U.S. national security
organizations following the terror attacks on 9/11 that sent its leaders to visit and
learn from JIATF South.
Some sources date the first JIATF to 1989, but they may be confusing JIATFs with Joint Task
Forces. JIATF South was evolved from a Joint Task Force but did not become a JIATF until 1994
when the director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy distributed the first National
Interdiction Command and Control Plan, which created JIATFs.
4 The discussion of JIATF South is based on Evan Munsing and Christopher Jon Lamb, “Joint
Interagency Task Force-South: The Best Known, Least Understood Interagency Success,” Strategic
Perspectives 5, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, June 2011.
3
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Collaboration is the ‘Key’ to Success
McChrystal dubbed the approach used by SOF special mission units
“collaborative warfare,”5 and the term was applicable. Interagency collaboration
was the key ingredient for success. McChrystal saw the U.S. counterterrorism
effort suffering for lack of interagency collaboration: “Early on,
counterproductive infighting among the CIA, State Department, Department of
Defense, and others back in Washington threatened [the] campaign [against alQaida].” The relationship between the CIA and Department of Defense was
particularly frustrating: “At best we were fighting parallel, fractured campaigns
against al-Qaeda; ours had to be a unified fight.”6
McChrystal accepted McRaven’s recommendation for “a true joint interagency
task force” and experimented with various versions of it. The interagency task
forces had to solve the fundamental problem of providing actionable intelligence
to SOF counterterrorism units as depicted in the “F3EA” diagram below. The
main effort was exploiting intelligence from operations and analyzing it rapidly,
which could only be done with real-time, ongoing interagency collaboration in
direct proximity to SOF units. Interagency collaboration was not just
“important” but “central to our effectiveness.” As McChrystal notes, “finishing”
the enemy had been SOF’s “traditional strength,” but exploiting and analyzing
intelligence now became SOF’s “main effort.”7
Figure 1: Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyze, Disseminate (F3EAD)8

Traditional
Strength

Main Effort

5 Bob Woodward, “Why Did the Violence Plummet? It Wasn’t Just the Surge,” The Washington
Post, September 8, 2008.
6 McChrystal, Stanley A., My Share of the Task: A Memoir (New York: Portfolio/Penguin, 2013),
118.
7 Ibid, 131, 153.
8
U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-60: The Targeting Process (Washington, D.C.:
HQDA, November 26, 2010): B-2.
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Often organizations pursuing missions that require interagency collaboration fail
precisely because they consider interagency collaboration merely an advantage
rather than an essential prerequisite for success. JIATF South receives more
than 8,000 visitors a year who marvel at the level of interagency collaboration
undergirding its counternarcotic operations. Unfortunately, the vast majority
leave amazed but not enlightened. JIATF South representatives explained to the
author that visitors who appear genuinely anxious to emulate its success
nonetheless are prone to return to their parent organizations and fail to make the
interagency the centerpiece of their operational focus. Thankfully, USSOCOM
leaders did not make this mistake. McChrystal made sure his entire organization
understood that “collaborative warfare” would be the order of the day.

Sponsoring Organizations Must Change First to Enable Collaboration
It has been argued that what distinguishes leadership from management is the
ability to change an organization’s culture.9 McChrystal seemed to understand
this. He realized that the great benefits from interagency teams “would also
require changes equally significant …physical, organizational, procedural, and—
most important—cultural” in his own organization.10 McChrystal had to make his
SOF units “more accommodating to those agencies we were courting.”11 To
create trust between all the interagency partners he needed to support his field
teams McChrystal had to first change his own organization, which was difficult.
McChrystal’s initiatives went against strongly held cultural norms in the SOF
units he was leading. Yet he did not believe there was any alternative: “We were
convinced the secretive and compartmentalized traditions of special operations
forces, particularly [special mission units], would doom us.” Ultimately he and
other SOF leaders were persuasive and the special mission units “deliberately
craft[ed] our work spaces to channel interaction, force collaboration and ease the
flow of people and information.”12 They bent classification rules and “shared
information until it hurt” in order to establish trust, which remained a fragile and
perishable commodity on the teams:
“We instructed our people to share more information than they were
comfortable with and to do so with anyone who wanted to be part of our
network. We allowed other agencies to follow our operations (previously
unheard of), and we widely distributed, without preconditions,
intelligence we captured or analysis we’d conducted. The actual
information shared was important, but more valuable was the trust built
up through voluntarily sharing it with others.”13
In addition to information sharing and partnering, McChrystal shared his
organization’s resources with others. He also allocated large numbers of his
I am indebted to Jim Kurtz of the Institute for Defense Analyses for this observation, who found
the assertion in Scroggs, Stephen K., Army Relations with Congress: Thick Armor, Dull Sword,
Slow Horse (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2000), which cited Edgar H. Schein, Organizational Culture
and Leadership. 2nd ed. (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 1992), 12.
10 McChrystal, My Share of the Task: A Memoir, 154.
11 Ibid, 149.
12 Ibid, 150-51.
13 Ibid, 154-55.
9
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scarce and highly-trained personnel to liaison duties. All of these practices were
counter-cultural for SOF special mission units, but essential for building trust
and removing impediments to collaboration.
Earlier, JIATF South had come to the same realization: It would have to change
itself before it could secure cooperation from other parties. When JIATF South
was still a Joint Task Force led by the Department of Defense it gave priority to
Department of Defense perspectives. The Department of Defense grudgingly
accepted the counter narcotics mission, and wanted to limit its involvement after
doing its part to detect drug trafficking. Department of Defense personnel were
prone to heavily classify their intelligence rather than share it with interagency
partners. Moreover, intelligence fusion and drug interdiction were largely kept
separate, so there was none of the meshing of intelligence and operations that
later become the hallmark of JIATF South. Gradually this all changed as
authorities, assets, and intelligence programs were consolidated and the Joint
Task Force became a Joint Interagency Task Force that transformed itself into a
genuine interagency construct. The culmination was a broadening of the
organization’s conceptualization of the counternarcotics mission into a holistic,
“end-to-end” construct from intelligence cueing in host countries to prosecution
of narcotics traffickers in the United States.

An ‘End-to-End’ Mission Approach is Necessary
All the elements of the F3EA chain of operational activities ultimately became
interagency efforts. Each element of the chain is a complex and difficult task.
Historically, SOF special mission units focus on the “finish” portion of the cycle;
i.e., the movement to target, take-down, and exfiltration from the site. After
years of operations against al-Qaida, however, SOF leaders realized they needed
to take responsibility for the full F3EA cycle (which with the addition of
disseminate later become F3EAD). They built teams that managed the entire
cycle holistically and became operational juggernauts capable of rounding up
numerous targets on a nightly basis. One knowledgeable British observer claims
that the “templated industrial manner” U.S. special mission units used “set a pace
of operations that probably removed from the streets most of the members of alQaeda in Iraq [AQI].”14 Initially focused on eliminating key terrorist leaders, SOF
special mission units began to aspire to wholesale attrition of the terrorist
organizations:
“If we could apply relentless body blows against AQI [it] would be
consumed with staying alive and thus have no ability to recruit, raise
funds, or strategize. Instead of trying solely to decapitate the top echelon
of leaders, we would disembowel the organization by targeting its
midlevel commanders…we believed we could get the organization to
collapse in on itself.”15
Urban, Mark, Task Force Black: The Explosive True Story of the SAS and the Secret War in Iraq
(London: Little, Brown, 2010), 266, 271.
15 McChrystal, My Share of the Task: A Memoir, 161-62; McChrystal seems conflicted over how
much attrition of terrorist organizational structure should be valued. On the same pages he notes,
“I had already concluded that a strict decapitation strategy was unlikely to work. Top al-Qaeda
leaders were well hidden, and their capture or death was rarely decisive. Moreover, a string of
effective operations could give us a false sense that we could slowly grind Zarqawi’s network out of
existence.” He argues the important point was to control the tempo and take the fight to lower
14
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The high pace of operations led some to hope that al-Qaida in Iraq would collapse
from attrition. Others despaired that SOF operations were creating too many
unintended casualties, too many enemies among otherwise neutral parties, and
not enough strategic effects. Eventually, the SOF interagency teams broadened
their understanding of second and third order effects to include the political and
social impact of their kill and capture operations. It was a not a transition easily
accepted by special mission units, but eventually SOF expanded the F3EA “endto-end” conceptualization of the SOF mission to include partnering with
conventional forces on counterinsurgency.16 The result was greater strategic
impact, and SOF operations were able to help reverse the deteriorating situation
in Iraq in 2007.
In this regard, SOF followed the pattern that transformed JIATF South. JIATF
South leaders could have continued to limit Department of Defense participation
in the counternarcotics mission, a stance that would have been popular with their
superiors. But eschewing responsibility for developing intelligence sources and
successfully prosecuting traffickers meant ignoring the activities that were the
focus of law enforcement agencies JIATF South that was trying to woo. So,
JIATF South leaders broadened their “end-to-end” concept for the organization’s
mission. The organization began to pay attention to the entire drug movement
process, from how bulk shipments were paid for and moved, to who benefited
from the shipments, to how traffickers were arrested, imprisoned, and turned
into informants, which then produced more intelligence that JIATF South could
use to improve interdiction and prosecutions. “This breadth of view made JIATF
East a natural ally for every agency involved in counterdrug operations,” and
finally “demonstrated that the whole-of-government approach to counter
narcotics [could be] dramatically greater than the sum of its parts.”17

Delegating Responsibility for Local Best Practices
The previous three prerequisites for success had to be led and supported by
senior leaders. However, McChrystal understood that while he could set the
conditions for success, he had to delegate responsibility for carrying out
interagency operations to keep pace with an adaptive and fast-moving foe:
“Much of my and my command team’s time was spent solidifying the
partnerships with the half dozen agencies involved in a single cycle of
F3EA. I knew the creative solutions …would originate from those closest
to the fight—closest to the hiccups. So while most members of [special
mission units] were self-starters by nature, I needed them to operate
without waiting for detailed instructions or approvals. [We] tried to set a
climate in which we prized entrepreneurship and free thinking, leaned
hard on complacency, and did not punish ideas that failed. ‘As long as it

ranks of the terrorist organization. Later he reports that he could feel al-Qaeda cracking under the
pressure of SOF’s relentless blows (p. 247), but admits some of that might have been wishful
thinking.
16 McChrystal, My Share of the Task: A Memoir, 244-46.
17 Munsing and Lamb, “Secret Weapon: High-value Target Teams as an Organizational Innovation,”
30.
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is not immoral or illegal,’ went my frequent refrain, ‘we’ll do it. Don’t wait
for me. Do it.’ ….we pushed authority down until it made us uneasy.”18
The result was that McChrystal’s general principles were applied to good effect by
his team leaders in light of local circumstances. In addition, innovation began to
well up from lower levels. McChrystal notes that “rarely did any one thing
transform our capacity, and few ideas could be traced back to one person.”
Instead, after long periods of gestation and incremental changes, major
improvements in performance occurred, which McChrystal documents in his
memoirs. When a best practice was developed or stumbled upon, SOF leaders
were quick to expand its use. They encouraged learning and made learning assets
available (McChrystal notes that “How to Be a Liaison Officer” was one of the
better instructional videos). Similarly, JIATF South learned to keep pace with its
well-financed, creative and ruthless foes by delegating authority, quickly
instituting best practices, developing a training program to get new arrivals up to
speed quickly, and pushing authority down to the lowest possible levels of the
organization. Visitors to JIATF South are often surprised to see relatively junior
officers directing sensitive operations while more senior officers present watch.
These lessons from SOF interagency collaboration and other JIATF experience
are useful for informing USSOCOM’s approach to building a global SOF network.
To make that argument it is first necessary to make a distinction between SOF’s
direct and indirect approaches. SOF progress on interagency collaboration has
been a byproduct of its direct approach to counterterrorism. SOF leaders believe
USSOCOM needs to focus more on its indirect approach in the future, something
the global SOF network is expected to facilitate. Thus, before examining whether
lessons from the past decade of interagency collaboration are applicable to SOF’s
indirect approach, we need to explain the distinction between the direct and
indirect approaches.

SOF’s Direct and Indirect Approaches
USSOCOM is now “shift[ing] the focus from counterterrorism operations to more
indirect activities in the human domain” through its global SOF network.19
USSOCOM often makes a distinction between direct and indirect SOF
approaches when making the case for a global SOF network to combat irregular
threats. Typically, the direct approach means U.S. SOF engaging a discrete threat
themselves. By contrast, the indirect approach usually refers to working with
partners to “erode the capabilities of terrorist organizations and degrade their
ability to acquire support and sanctuary.”20 The archetypical examples of the
direct and indirect approach often cited are, respectively, the mission by U.S. SOF
to kill Usama bin Laden and the advisory mission U.S. SOF have performed over
the past decade in support of the Philippine government efforts to counter
terrorism by Abu Sayyaf. Sometimes the direct approach is described as
requiring intense interagency collaboration, while the indirect approach requires
intense collaboration with foreign partners understanding that some countries
McChrystal, My Share of the Task: A Memoir, 157.
Col. Stuart W. Bradin, Chief of the Global SOF Network Operational Planning Team, "Interview
notes," Special Operations Technology 11:7 (October 4, 2013).
20 U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-26: Counterterrorism (Washington, D.C.: Joint
Chiefs of Staff, November 13, 2009): xv.
18
19
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incorporate their SOF into the Ministry of Interior or Justice. For example, the
current commander of USSOCOM, Admiral William H. McRaven, described the
two approaches this way in testimony to the U.S. Congress:
“The direct approach is characterized by technologically-enabled smallunit precision lethality, focused intelligence, and interagency cooperation
integrated on a digitally-networked battlefield….the impacts of the direct
approach are immediate, visible to public and have had tremendous
effects on our enemies’ networks throughout the decade. Less well known
but decisive in importance, the indirect approach…includes empowering
host nation forces, providing appropriate assistance to humanitarian
agencies, and engaging key populations. These long-term efforts increase
partner capabilities to generate sufficient security and rule of law, address
local needs, and advance ideas that discredit and defeat the appeal of
violent extremism” (emphasis added).21
Admiral McRaven noted the two approaches are complementary and both “build
trust and confidence with our partners,” but “the indirect approach values localled efforts to buy down our partners’ security threats.” He went on to associate
the indirect approach with USSOCOM’s interest in a global SOF network:
“The indirect approach will be critical in the fight to deter, disrupt and
deny sanctuary to our enemies. Therefore, we must use this approach to
strengthen and foster a network of mutually supporting partnerships that
are based on shared security interests. Through this network of
relationships, SOF can provide a hedge against strategic surprise by
identifying and working preemptively to address problems before they
become conflicts.”22
The indirect approach involves working with foreign partners, and requires wellestablished and exercised relationships with those partners. McRaven led the
effort to create a NATO SOF headquarters to improve SOF networking and
interoperability among NATO allies and subsequently went on to lead
USSOCOM’s effort to create a global SOF network. Other well-informed SOF
observers agree with McRaven that SOF’s indirect approach will be more
important in the future, especially after the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan recede.
They reason that “operations outside designated war zones will necessitate
greater collaboration with foreign forces and interagency partners.”23 Hence, the
central importance of the indirect approach and cross-organizational
collaboration for McRaven’s global SOF network concept.
The distinction between direct and indirect SOF approaches can be applied to
SOF in different ways, as depicted in Table 1 (SOF Approaches), potentially
leading to confusion. Sometimes the distinction is used to emphasize different
Admiral William H. McRaven, Commander, United States Special Operations Command,
"Posture Statement," Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, U.S. Senate, March
6, 2012.
22 Ibid.
23 See, for example, Thomas, Jim and Christopher Dougherty, Beyond the Ramparts: The Future of
U.S. Special Operations Forces (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary
Assessments, May 2013), available at: http://www.csbaonline.org/publications/2013/05/beyondthe-ramparts-the-future-of-u-s-special-operations-forces/.
21

15
https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol7/iss2/3
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.7.2.2

Lamb: Global SOF and Interagency Collaboration

SOF skill sets and which SOF units tend to specialize in skills more closely
associated with the direct or indirect approach. Sometimes the distinction is
used to highlight how different SOF missions are more closely associated with
one or the other approach, and whether those missions are more often conducted
in intense partnership with other U.S. Government agencies or foreign partners.
Finally, the differences between the direct and indirect approach are also used to
explain different SOF objectives, how they support national goals, and their
respective strategic advantages and disadvantages.
Adding to the disarray is the fact that there are exceptions to every generalization
that can be made about the direct/indirect approaches. Even if some missions
are more commonly conducted directly or indirectly, SOF can execute all
assigned missions themselves or through other forces. Similarly, any SOF
missions may require intense interagency or international collaboration. Thus,
even if it is generally true that the SOF direct approach to counterterrorism over
the past decade has been interagency intensive compared to the indirect
approach that has required more collaboration with foreign forces, the indirect
approach in the future will need to be both intensely interagency and
international in order to be successful.
Table 1: SOF Approaches
SOF Skills
Means Forces

Missions

SOF Approaches
Direct
Superlative small unit
close quarter combat
skills
Air Commandos
Special Mission Units
Navy SEALS
Rangers

Indirect
Political, cultural, and
linguistic skills
Special Forces
Civil Affairs
Psychological Operations

Counterterrorism
Counter proliferation
Direct Action
Strategic
Reconnaissance
Information
Operations
Interagency

Unconventional Warfare
Psychological Operations
Foreign Internal Defense
Civil Affairs

Supporting
force

Assist partners
physically destroy the
adversary

Lead force

Physically destroy the
adversary

Advise partners on
reducing sources of
support until adversary
collapses
Reduce sources of
support until adversary
collapses

Ways

Partnerships

Ends

International

Because distinguishing between SOF direct and indirect approaches can be
confusing or even misleading many in the special operations community do not
find the terms helpful and have stopped using them. Yet, the distinction holds
true in the main and is useful for describing and explaining SOF skills, forces and
16
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missions. The distinction is also important for prescriptive purposes. If SOF’s
indirect approach will be more important in the future, then USSOCOM needs to
develop the same cross-organizational collaboration skills for the indirect SOF
approach that it has used to such good effect in its direct approach to
counterterrorism.24

SOF Interagency Collaboration and the Indirect Approach
For several reasons it will be harder for USSOCOM to act on collaboration
imperatives while pursing SOF’s indirect approach. As already noted, SOF
special mission units have more latitude to act independently against terrorists in
war zones than they do in peacetime environments, so the inclination of other
departments and agencies to follow SOF’s lead will diminish. In addition,
USSOCOM forces that are more comfortable with the indirect approach have less
prestige and fewer resources to share with other departments and agencies to
facilitate collaboration. The perceived need for interagency collaboration also
may fall off. McChrystal understood he could not succeed without interagency
assistance, but many confuse SOF’s indirect approach with simply training
foreign forces; something they believe the military—and even forces other than
SOF—can handle alone for the most part. However, SOF’s indirect approach is
not equivalent to just providing military training. SOF work with foreign forces
to achieve security objectives shared by foreign governments and ours in ways
that are consistent with U.S. interests and values, something that requires intense
interagency collaboration, particularly with the Department of State.25
Some may argue it will be impossible for USSOCOM to develop a refined
interagency capacity to employ SOF indirectly against irregular threats through
partnerships with other governments and their security forces. They will note the
Department of State has the lead for security assistance, and that within
embassies, the senior military representative on country teams is typically the
defense attaché or security assistance officer, neither of whom typically come
from SOF. Others may argue that special mission units are already taking the
indirect approach to irregular threats in non-war zones and there is no need to
see a similar capacity employed by Special Forces and others from the U.S. Army
Special Operations Command. Finally, some may even argue that the Special
Forces and U.S. Army Special Operations Command are not up to the task; that
their culture is too insular and not innovative enough to emulate the interagency
successes of special mission units.
None of these objections are compelling. It is true that USSOCOM’s plans for a
global SOF network have raised concerns in Congress and the Department of
State.26 McChrystal’s initiatives also raised concerns. He “lacked a clear mandate
to either build a network or get other organizations to join it,” and “critics in
different parts of the U.S. Government felt we were straying outside our
traditional role.” Yet he “saw no other organization weaving the kind of web that
was needed” and he took responsibility for building a team that would embrace
The author and others have made this argument in testimony to Congress.
Christopher Jon Lamb, “The Future of U.S. Special Operations Forces,” Testimony before the
Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee, House Armed Services Committee, U.S. House
of Representatives, July 11, 2012.
26 Paul McLeary, “Lawmakers Skeptical of Global Spec Ops Plan,” Army Times, August 10, 2013.
24
25
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all activities necessary to generate desire outcomes.27 Concerns in Congress and
other national security organizations must be allayed, but in principle they are
not insurmountable obstacles. For example, it is true that State has the lead for
security assistance but there is nothing to prevent ambassadors from allowing
SOF personnel to lead an interagency sub-group of the country team to deal with
specific security threats in foreign countries. Ambassadors are also the senior
U.S. officials in countries where special mission units operate using the direct
approach, and that has not proven to be an impossible impediment.
Similarly, while it is true that defense attachés and security assistance officers
traditionally are the senior military representatives on country teams, there is
nothing to prevent the Department of Defense from recommending and sending
SOF personnel to lead an interagency group charged with the mission of leading
the overall U.S. support effort against an irregular threat in another country.
While it may be true that special mission units are already operating against
irregular threats in non-war zones, that does not mean they are the best choice to
do so. Some even suggest special mission units pay lip service to the indirect
approach to gain access in order to directly engage their terrorist targets. In any
case, the argument made here is that the U.S. Army Special Operations
Command would be a better choice for USSOCOM. It owns the SOF units best
suited to the indirect approach, and should be the force providers for the Theater
Special Operations Commands that oversee SOF operations for Geographic
Commands. It remains to be determined whether the U.S. Army Special
Operations Command and its Special Forces are inclined to take the lead in this
area. If they are not, it should be a matter of some concern to USSOCOM since
the indirect approach is an historic focus of Army Special Forces.
The Department of Defense and USSOCOM have detailed plans for implementing
the global SOF network.28 However, to emulate the interagency successes of the
special mission units, they need to act upon the four prerequisites identified
above. That means forging interagency relationships in Washington, D.C. to
support greater collaboration in U.S. embassies between SOF and other
departments and agencies, which McRaven is attempting to do through a
Washington office dedicated to interagency collaboration.29 It means having the
U.S. Army Special Operations Command, which owns the SOF units best suited
to the indirect approach, make interagency collaboration the critical priority for
the command. It means making more resources available to that Command and
in ways that would permit them to share resources with the Department of State
and other U.S. national security organizations. It means that USSOCOM, and
more specifically the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, will have to
change their own organizational cultures to better support SOF’s indirect
approach and collaboration with other organizations like the Department of
State. Finally, the nation, and perhaps SOCOM, would have to accept the risks
associated with granting more latitude to embassy country teams and interagency
groups operating out of them to achieve national objectives through indirect
Ibid.
Szayna, Thomas S. and William Welser, Developing and Assessing Options for the Global SOF
Network (Santa Monica: RAND, 2013).
29 Ibid; USSOCOM believes this office would be better able to work interagency collaboration than
the extensive and somewhat unwieldy set of liaison officers parked in innumerable offices by special
mission units.
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means. All of these requirements would be difficult to pursue without the
perceived collective urgency that was widely embraced after the terror attacks on
September 11, 2001.

Conclusion
The lessons from SOF and JIATF experience are much more easily identified
than implemented. Many leaders, even those who have witnessed the efficacy of
well-managed cross-organizational collaboration and understand its importance,
would find it difficult to act upon the observations made here. Making
collaboration the priority and changing one’s own organization to facilitate
collaboration is painful. It is far easier, and often safer, to promote the
importance of collaboration without doing anything to irritate one’s superiors or
subordinates. Embracing an “end-to-end” mission approach that makes an
organization and its leaders responsible for collective outcomes they cannot fully
or easily control also is difficult and dangerous; as is delegating authority to lower
levels where embarrassing mistakes may be made.
Yet these prerequisites for success are as necessary as they are difficult.
Interagency success for SOF’s indirect approach against capable adversaries is
inconceivable without intense interagency collaboration, however difficult it may
prove to be. To his great credit, General McChrystal realized this and had the
leadership capacity to change his organization, its structure, processes and
culture accordingly. It will be even more difficult for USSOCOM to achieve a
similar success in its indirect approach to SOF missions through a global SOF
network and interagency partnerships managed out of U.S. embassies overseas.
But as is often observed, the first step in solving any problem is recognizing the
nature of the problem and what is required to solve it. The rest is all disciplined,
aggressive, and intelligent implementation, something USSOCOM, the U.S. Army
Special Operations Command and Special Forces are capable of doing just as well
as special mission units.
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